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Synopsis 
 
 
This book is an examination of the socio-economic problems of 
long-term unemployment (LTU) and repeat Job Seeker’s Allowance 
(JSA) spells.  It asks what are the individual, class, economic, 
educational, institutional, structural, social, and other factors 
contributing to LTU and repeat JSA spells?  It includes discussion of 
the current debate regarding these factors and analyses this against 
current trends.   
 
This book concludes that LTU and repeat JSA claims are essentially 
two symptoms of the same core problems occurring in the UK 
labour market that conspire to prevent some workers from gaining 
long-term sustainable employment.   
 
Using the information gathered, this work proposes a number of 
public policy solutions to these problems.   
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Introduction 
Research objective 
The objective of this work is an examination of the institutional, 
structural, social, economic, educational, class and other 
contributing factors towards the socio-economic problems of long-
term unemployment (LTU) and of the ‘recycling’ of workers between 
short-term/insecure employment and Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA).  
From this foundation of understanding, the intention is to explore 
what public policy solutions may be necessary to reduce the 
incidence of these contributing factors in the future.     
 
Key definitions 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has defined long-term unemployment (LTU) as “that 
involving people out of work and looking for work for 12 months or 
more” (OECD, 1988).  This definition will be that used in this work. 
 
‘Recycling’, ‘re-tread’ or ‘churning’ is the situation where individuals 
repeatedly claim JSA without finding sustained employment 
between claims (Carpenter 2006).   
 
‘Employability’ is defined by the Department for Employment and 
Learning in Northern Ireland as “the capability to move into and 
within labour markets and to realise potential through sustainable 
and accessible employment” (DELNI, 2002).  
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Research questions 
To assist in the exploration of LTU and ‘recycling’, the following 
research questions have been chosen:  
• What are the institutional, structural, social, economic, class, 
educational and other factors contributing to long-term 
unemployment? 
• What are the institutional, structural, social, economic, class, 
educational and other factors contributing to the “recycling” of 
workers between short-term/insecure employment and 
Jobseeker’s Allowance? 
• What changes or improvements to the UK benefits regime, 
and other areas of public policy would address these 
contributing factors and reduce long-term unemployment and 
the recycling of workers between short-term employment and 
Job Seeker’s Allowance?  
 
These broadly defined questions were chosen to give the greatest 
depth of understanding of the issues concerned, and thus meet the 
objectives of this work. 
 
Methodological limitations – Ontological and epistemological 
assumptions 
An interpretivist approach was adopted in the research and writing 
of this work. The full range of qualitative and quantitative research 
methodologies were examined in preparation for this work and use 
of surveys, focus groups and action research could have yielded 
some very interesting and constructive data.  Unfortunately, due to 
tight time limitations of this research project there was no 
opportunity to conduct primary research.   Research for this work 
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has therefore been ‘desk based’ focusing on relevant academic 
work and supported by secondary data gathered by academics and 
organisations such as the OECD, United Nations International 
Labour Organisation (UN ILO), the United Kingdom’s Department 
for Work and Pensions, (DWP) and the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS).   
 
Using a triangulation of the theoretical and statistical data available, 
this work will seek to answer these research questions and further 
increase our understanding of LTU and ‘recycling’, and how such 
problems can be solved through public policy.     
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Chapter 1  
The UK welfare system and Job Seeker’s Allowance in 
context 
 
Historical development of the UK welfare state 
 
The modern welfare state in the United Kingdom has its roots in 
informal Christian giving; however, over time this has been 
increasingly taken over by the state (Barr 2004).  Early public poor 
relief was driven by chronic labour shortages and the fear of social 
disorder in the years after the Black Death of 1348-49.  The Statute 
of Labourers 1351 and the Poor Law Act 1388 saw the state attempt 
to control wages and labour mobility.  The 1576 Poor Relief Act 
enshrined the concept of ‘setting the poor on work’ and remained in 
force for around 350 years (Fraser, 1984).   
 
The 1601 Poor Law Act built on the 1576 Act and required that each 
parish assume responsibility for its poor, categorising them as: ‘the 
impotent poor’ (the old and the sick), the able bodied and those who 
refused to work.  The impotent poor were accommodated in 
almshouses, the able bodied were given work in a ‘house of 
correction’ (later to become residential workhouses), and those who 
refused work were punished in these houses of correction.  This 
system was in place for nearly two hundred years; however, these 
locally financed institutions which had been adapted for a pre-
industrial economy were unable to cope with population growth, 
increasing social mobility, industrialisation and economic 
fluctuations.   
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By 1795, war and bad harvests had led to food shortages and 
inflation.  Poverty spread from the unemployed to those in work, 
leading to the adoption of various local solutions such as the 
Spreenhamland system which supplemented wages with an 
‘allowance’ based on the price of bread (Barr, 2004).   
 
As the Napoleonic Wars ended and soldiers returned, rising prices 
and unemployment led to the costs of these schemes escalating 
rapidly.  This, combined with the criticisms the institutions had 
received from writers such as Bentham, Ricardo and Malthus, led to 
a Royal Commission being established in 1832.  ‘The  Poor Law 
Report’, written by Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick, and the 
Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 were laissez-faire in tone and 
reflected the position of many classical economists of the time.  In 
Senior’s opinion, “the great test which must be applied to any 
project of state action in regard to relief is the question whether it 
has any tendency to increase that which is it proposed to diminish” 
(Robbins, 1977, P128, emphasis in original).  Thus Senior 
supported the help for orphans, the blind, and the disabled, 
including provision of medical treatment and hospitals.  The Poor 
Law Report contained three core principles (also known as ‘the 
Principles of 1834”): Less eligibility (the relief should be limited to an 
amount and administered in such a way that left the recipient worse 
off than the employed); the workhouse test (relief conditional upon 
living in the workhouse), and administrative centralisation.  The 
workhouse test was not really a principle but more of a means of 
enforcing less eligibility.   
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The Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 followed quickly after the 
report; however, the implementation of the act was more unpleasant 
than was the intention of its architects (Bowley, 1937).  Many were 
forced to endure the harsh conditions of the workhouse while many 
others endured appalling privation to avoid it.  Thus, the 1834 Act is 
often seen as the roots of later development (Barr, 2004). 
 
The next major period of development was the Liberal Reforms 
between 1906 and 1914.  Although comprising a variety of Acts 
covering education, old-age pensions, health and fiscal policy, the 
reforms also included the National Insurance Act 1911.  
Unemployment insurance was the key feature of the Act; however, 
this was strictly limited to workers earning less than £160 per year, it 
only applied to a narrow range of industries, and benefits were kept 
deliberately low to discourage voluntary unemployment (Barr, 2004).  
Health insurance was also included as it was recognised that 
sickness and unemployment were interrelated.   
 
The First World War put a halt to most welfare state development 
barring housing and planning policy.  The next major development 
was the Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 which further expanded 
the coverage of the National Insurance Act 1911 to more workers 
and gave an allowance to their dependents in response to the rising 
unemployment in the post-war period, especially among 
demobilised soldiers.   
 
As a result of the 1926 Blanesburgh Committee report, the 
Unemployment Insurance Act introduced two new benefits: 
Standard benefit, paid as an insurance benefit for an indefinite 
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duration to anyone who made any contributions; and Transitional 
benefit, payable to those who did not meet the requirements of the 
insurance scheme so long as they were ‘genuinely seeking work’.  
Both of these benefits were paid from the insurance fund which 
came under increasing pressure as unemployment rose.   
 
In 1930, the then Labour Government amended the Transitional 
benefit by paying it out of general government revenues instead of 
the insurance fund and also by relaxing the ‘genuinely seeking 
employment’ clause.  This led to the numbers receiving Transitional 
benefit doubling within two months, and eventually costing £19 
million in the first year (Barr, 2004).  This, combined with the 1929 
Stock Market Crash and ensuing depression, quickly led to a 
benefits crisis in 1931 which split the then Labour cabinet.  This led 
to the formation of a National Government.  Benefits were cut by 10 
per cent from 17s. (85 pence) to 15s. 3d. (76 pence).  Standard 
benefit was limited to 26 weeks and the administration transferred to 
local Public Assistance Committees (PACs) (Barr, 2004).  As well as 
cuts in benefits, eligibility was tightened although with regional 
variation, the interpretation of ‘genuinely seeking work’ became 
much more stringent, and the PAC administered Transitional benefit 
was given on the basis of the Poor Law household means test 
resulting in widespread public anger and many new workers being 
subject to the Poor Law.  Similar to today, according to Barr (2004), 
the unemployment rate varied between the regions while long-term 
unemployment was concentrated in a small number of decaying 
areas.   
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The Unemployment Act 1934 sought to create, and did in fact 
achieve, a more effective and standardised system of 
unemployment insurance.  Part I of the Act extended compulsory 
insurance to more workers, restored benefits to their pre-1931 level, 
organised contributions so that one-third each came from the 
worker, the employer and the government, established an 
independent committee to run the system responsible only for those 
receiving insurance benefits.  Part II of the Act sought to give 
assistance to those with no cover, or those for whom cover had 
expired.  Cover was paid for from general government funds and 
operated on a national basis through a new organisation, the 
Unemployment Assistance Board.   
 
The next, and some would say climacteric stage of development of 
the British welfare state was from the period 1940 – 48.  The 1942 
Beveridge Report resulted in the need to prepare for the post-war 
era.  The report had three basic assumptions: that a scheme of 
family allowances would be established; that there would be a 
system of universal health-care; and that the state would seek to 
maintain full employment (Barr, 2004).  The 1944 White Paper, 
Social Insurance accepted most of the Beveridge Report’s 
recommendations and these became the basis for the National 
Insurance Act 1946.  Post-war employment policy was Keynesian 
focused and committed the government ‘to the maintenance of a 
high and stable level of employment’ (Department of Labour, 1944) 
through the use of counter-cyclical deficit spending.  Other important 
Acts at the time include the National Health Service Act 1946 which 
established the National Health Service (NHS), the National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 which gave financial help to 
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those injured at work, and the National Assistance Act 1948 which 
created a universal safety net for those not covered by insurance.  
The former Assistance Board became the National Assistance 
Board and assumed all responsibilities, including those of the local 
PACs leftover from the Poor Law, which were explicitly repealed in 
the Act (Barr, 2004).   
 
The system of National Insurance remained largely unchanged until 
1966 when the National Insurance Board was abolished and 
replaced with the Supplementary Benefits Commission, with wider 
discretionary powers.  In 1971 a ‘Family Income Supplement’ was 
introduced to help working families with children.  The Social 
Security Act 1975 replaced the weekly ‘stamp’ with an earnings-
based contribution from all employed persons, thus enabling 
redistribution from the higher to lower earners.  There was also a 
wider proliferation of benefits leading to there being over fifty 
benefits outside national insurance by the early 1970s (UK Select 
Committee on Tax Credit, 1973, pp47-48).   
 
Deteriorating economic conditions from 1976 again put pressure on 
the whole benefits system.  The 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher 
paved the way for a series of reforms in what some writers such as 
Glennerster (2000) and Barr (2004) have called ‘attempted 
retrenchment’.  Glennerster and Hill (1998) and Glennerster (2000) 
argue that although ideology played its part in this, external factors 
such as successive oil shocks, increasing global pressures and an 
ageing population were more important drivers of change.  These 
reforms included unemployment benefit being reduced in amount 
(Atkinson, 1995a), indexation of benefits being tied to prices instead 
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of wages, and a general movement towards means-testing (Barr, 
2004).   
 
In 1996 the government introduced ‘Job Seeker’s Allowance’ (JSA) 
in an attempt to streamline the benefits system and to address the 
problem of long-term unemployment.  Job Seeker’s Allowance 
comes in two forms: Contribution-based Job Seeker’s Allowance or 
JSA (C) and Income-based Job Seeker’s Allowance or JSA (IB).  
Individuals are eligible for JSA (C) if they have paid or been credited 
with Class 1 National Insurance (NI) Contributions.  JSA (IB) is 
based on income and savings, and is for claimants who have not 
made enough National Insurance Contributions (NICs), paid only 
contributions for being self employed and are on a low income 
(DWP, 2009).  The Department for Work and Pensions has since 
conducted various studies into JSA and a recent report, by 
Carpenter (2006) entitled ‘Research Report No. 394: Repeat Job 
Seeker’s Allowance Spells’ identified the problem of ‘recycling’ of 
individuals between JSA and short-term employment.  The report 
proposed a number of contributing factors based on a survey of 
repeat JSA recipients.  The full results of this report will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
The 1997 election brought New Labour to power with the aim of 
pursuing a third way between the efforts of the 1960s and 1970s 
which focused on coverage and adequacy, and those of the 1980s 
which focused on efficiency, labour-market incentives, and fiscal 
constraint (Barr, 2004).  New Labour introduced the ‘New Deal’ in 
1998 as a programme of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) 
similar to those traditionally seen in Scandinavian nations.  The New 
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Deal has comprised six different sub-programmes designed to help 
key : New Deal for Young People (NDYP) for people aged 18-25 
and unemployed for six months or longer, New Deal 25+ for adults 
aged over 25 and unemployed for eighteen months or longer, New 
Deal for Lone Parents which seeks to help lone parents with school 
age children back into employment, New Deal for the Disabled 
which supports individuals on incapacity benefit to return to work, 
New Deal 50+ for those aged 50 and older, and New Deal for 
Musicians for unemployed musicians.  These are set to be replaced 
by the Flexible New Deal from October 2009 which seeks to give 
more appropriate advice and support to jobseekers.    
 
The recent academic debate has increasingly focused on more 
individual focused and the customisation of benefits. In 2008, the 
DWP commissioned Professor Paul Gregg to examine personalised 
conditionality, i.e. setting specific conditions for benefit recipients to 
meet before benefit payments are made, for example, attending 
particular educational courses.  Gregg concludes that what would 
best be put in place is a system where individuals receiving benefits 
should be required to engage in activities that will help them move 
towards, and then into employment.  Also, that they should have a 
clear understanding of what is expected of them and the 
consequences of failure. Finally, that they should be able to access 
a wide range of personal support based on need, not on the type of 
benefits they receive.   
 
On 10 December 2008, the DWP published its white paper: Raising 
expectations and increasing support: reforming welfare for the 
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future, following on from its green paper: No one written off: 
Reforming welfare to reward responsibility (DWP 2008).  This white 
paper put forward numerous radical steps such as a single income-
replacement benefit for people of working age, devolving more 
power to private and voluntary welfare providers, personalised 
conditionality, more help for the disabled and lone parents, stronger 
sanctions for benefit fraud, more help for drug addicts, and further 
steps aimed at ending child poverty by 2020.  Gregg’s 2008 
Realising Potential: A Vision for Personal Conditionality and Support 
is also discussed in the white paper and its recommendations feed 
through into many areas of the white paper.      
 
Recent trends 
As seen in Graph 1.1 below, recent trends in OECD data suggest a 
long-term decline in the LTU rate as a % of the unemployed.  
Despite these declines, the figures still suggest that on average 
around 2% of the labour force has remained LTU.   
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Graph 1.1: Long-term unemployment rate and Incidence of 
long-term unemployment in the UK: 1990 - 2007 
 
Source of data: OECD Labour Force Statistics.   
 
The academic debate 
Key recent academic works include Esping-Anderson (1990) argue 
that there exist three different types of welfare regimes with different 
underlying premises and doctrines which he labelled ‘conservative’, 
‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’.  The ‘conservative model’, as found 
in Germany, France, Austria and Italy is characterised by 
occupationally segregated social-insurance programmes.   The 
‘liberal’, as found in the United States and Canada, and increasingly 
the UK, is characterised by catering to the needs of working classes 
and the poor, with the middle classes seeking private insurance and 
occupational benefits.   Finally, the ‘social democratic’, as found in 
Scandinavian countries which provided benefits designed for the 
preferences and expectations of the middle class, while retaining a 
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universalism of rights.  These promote inclusivity and the prevention 
of social marginalisation.   
 
Fitzpatrick (2001) identifies four key welfare ideologies: ‘The radical 
right’, ‘conservatism’, ‘social democracy’ and ‘Marxism’.  The radical 
right is identified as those with a commitment to economic liberalism 
and to moral conservatism.  The radical right is highly hostile to the 
welfare state believing it to “weaken the economy and sap the 
morality of society” (Fitzpatrick 2001 Pg. 121).  Pierson (1998 
summarised in Fitzpatrick 2001) argues that the radical right is also 
hostile to the welfare state for reducing the rewards of success and 
lightening the burdens of failure, crowding out of the private sector, 
having a monopoly on the provision of welfare services leading to 
market distortions and inefficiency, misidentifying the nature and 
causes of poverty, creating a ‘dependency culture’, being a slippery 
slope from a nanny state to an autocratic dictatorship, and that it 
stresses rights and entitlements over duties and responsibilities.  
Fitzpatrick argues that conservatism is broadly supportive of state 
provision of welfare services, especially in the field of ‘one-nation 
conservatism’ which is committed to national unity and class 
consensus.  Social democracy, Fitzpatrick argues, is the belief that 
“an enabling, redistributive, managerial state is required…to create 
high levels of employment and ensure that the national wealth is 
distributed fairly” (2001 Pg. 128).  Lastly, Marxist theorists are 
critical of the welfare state, viewing it as part of the ‘ideological state 
apparatus’ (ISA) which helps to secure support for capitalism from 
the poor and exploited, the very people with most to gain from 
capitalism’s abolition.   
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Fitzpatrick, in this 2005 work, New Theories of Welfare discusses 
the ideological roots of many ideas about welfarism and the 
continued debate between conservatives and social democrats as 
to human nature and what the role of the state should be, given their 
theory of human nature.  Fitzpatrick later goes on to discuss the 
possible new role of genetics in social policy; for example, in genetic 
screening.   
 
Clasen (2005) describes the increasing use of ‘welfare-to-work’ or 
‘activation’ policies and schemes which seek to aid the transition 
from unemployment benefits into paid employment such as the 
introduction of Job Seeker’s Allowance in 1996 and the New Deal in 
1998.  This new approach has itself generated new issues and 
areas of discussion which will continue in later chapters.   
 
This history of the UK welfare state and examination of the recent 
academic debate help to frame the theoretical and ideological 
debate around which the welfare state in the UK has evolved: a 
continuous tension and cycle between expanding coverage to help 
the poor and unemployed, and retrenchment to prevent dependency 
and waste.   
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Chapter 2 
Contributing factors to long-term unemployment 
 
This chapter will examine the contributing factors to long-term 
unemployment (LTU), i.e. unemployment of longer than 12 months 
as defined by the OECD.  These factors will be examined by 
addressing demand-side factors and supply-side factors in the 
labour market and how these interact leading to LTU.   
 
According to the Department for Employment and Learning in 
Northern Ireland, LTU is determined by employability and: 
“For the individual, employability depends on: 
• The knowledge and skills they possess, and their attitudes; 
• The way personal attributes are presented in the labour 
market; 
• The environmental and social context within which work is 
sought; and 
• The economic context within which work is sought” (DELNI, 
2002).  
 
These claims are very interesting and agree with what one would 
intuitively assume to be some of the key factors in determining 
LTU.  Let us now discuss these factors.  
Labour market demand-side factors: 
De-industrialisation and wider structural issues 
Bazen and Thirlwall (1989) argue that deindustrialisation since 1966 
has been a major driving force behind increasing levels of 
unemployment.  They noted that between 1966 and 1979 over two 
million jobs were lost in manufacturing.  The small increase in the 
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size of the service sector and an increase in the size of the labour 
force led to unemployment rising by over one million.  Between 
1979 and 1983, manufacturing again lost 1.7 million jobs and 
unemployment rose by a similar amount in this time.  Using 
‘Kaldor’s growth laws’, Bazen and Thirlwall also point to the decline 
of manufacturing having wider negative implications for economic 
growth.  The first of Kaldor’s growth laws is that there is a strong 
positive relationship between the growth of manufacturing and rate 
of growth in an economy as a whole.  The second law, also known 
as ‘Verdoon’s Law’, is that there is a strong positive relationship 
between the growth of manufacturing output and the growth of 
productivity in manufacturing.  The third law states that there is a 
strong positive relationship between the rate at which manufacturing 
output and employment grows, and the rate at which productivity 
grows outside manufacturing, because resources are used which 
would otherwise be unemployed or have a lower productivity (Bazen 
and Thirlwall 1989).  The cumulative effect of these laws is that 
under the right conditions, a strong manufacturing sector will drive 
forward growth.  Inevitably, the opposite is also true: a vicious circle 
of low economic growth, low productivity growth, declining 
competitiveness and the shedding of labour from the manufacturing 
sector due to a lack of domestic and foreign demands for the 
products produced can also occur, which is arguably the case in 
Britain (Bazen and Thirlwall 1989).  This will inevitably lead to much 
higher levels of unemployment and thus LTU, especially as former 
industrial workers struggle to adapt to new roles in the private 
sector.       
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Due to de-industrialisation and other factors, there have also 
emerged pockets of severe deprivation in the UK which suffer from 
a high percentage of LTU and widespread worklessness.  Since 
2000, the Social Disadvantage Research Centre (SDRC) has 
produced three English Indices of Deprivation for Communities and 
Local Government to aid the allocation of resources for 
neighbourhood renewal (Communities and Local Government, 
2008).  Under the English system, the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
2007 (IMD 2007) which forms part of the Index of Deprivation 2007 
is based on the small area geography known as Lower Super 
Output Areas (LSOAs). LSOAs have between 1000 and 3000 
people living in them with an average population of 1500 people. In 
most cases, these are smaller than wards, thus allowing the 
identification of small pockets of deprivation.  There are 32,482 
LSOAs in England. The LSOA ranked 1 by the IMD 2007 is the 
most deprived and that ranked 32,482 is the least deprived.  The 
IMD brings together 37 different indicators which cover specific 
aspects or dimensions of deprivation: Income, Employment, Health 
and Disability, Education, Skills and Training, Barriers to Housing 
and Services, Living Environment and Crime. These are weighted 
and combined to create the overall IMD 2007 (Communities and 
Local Government, 2008).  The results show that pockets of severe 
deprivation and LTU co-exist in many areas formerly dominated by 
industry such as coal or slate mining, steel-making, ship building, 
cotton weaving, and associated trades.  This includes north Wales 
(a former slate mining area), the Welsh Valleys, County Durham 
and South Yorkshire (form coal mining areas), Tyneside and the 
Clyde, Glasgow (form shipbuilding and steel making areas), 
Birmingham (former vehicle building city), East Lancashire (former 
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cotton weaving area) and Bradford (former wool producing area with 
associated industries).  The evidence thus supports de-
industrialisation of areas that were formerly dominated by 
concentrated industry as being key to LTU and other social 
problems.  These areas have thus suffered as a result of the 
decreasing demand for labour.    
 
The mechanisation of previously labour intensive industrial and 
production processes and/or the displacement of labour by artificial 
intelligence has been seen by some commentators such as Postal-
Viney (2002) as being important to the debate on what has come to 
be known as ‘technological unemployment’.  Postal-Viney examined 
OECD data going back the 1970s and concluded that there existed 
short- and long-run “Schempeterian” effects of technological 
change.  In the short-run, technological change can have positive 
effects on employment.  In the long-run however, Postal-Viney 
concedes that faster technological chance accelerates job 
obsolescence which reduces the equilibrium level of employment 
(Postal-Viney 2002).  This would undoubtedly lead to LTU as 
workers skill-sets and training are made completely obsolete across 
the entire labour market. They would then be forced to spend long 
periods of time re-training to either move into a different industry or 
to master the higher-level technical skills demanded of those 
working in the same sector.   
 
Freeman (2008) has concluded from analysis of various sources of 
data that a factor contributing to economic performance and thus 
levels of employment are labour market institutions.  This includes 
institutions involved in wage-setting such as trade unions, 
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employment protection legislation and the law around employment 
contracts, regulations for employing labour, social security 
regulations and spending.  However, Freeman discovers that 
regulations have little effect on the overall level of aggregate 
unemployment (Freeman 2008 p. 22).  Only wage-setting to an 
intermediate level will lead the economy to produce high wages and 
unemployment (Freeman 2008 p. 23), and that “in a study that takes 
account of many of the criticisms of earlier cross-country time series 
data, Bassanini and Duval (2006) estimated that changes in tax and 
labour policies explain about half of 1982-2003 changes in 
unemployment among countries, with tax policies playing a 
particularly important role” (Freeman, 2008, Pg. 22).  Freeman also 
argues that the data suggest labour market institutions such as the 
minimum wage have no conclusive effect on efficiency or 
unemployment, but have a well-defined impact on income 
distribution with nations such as the US with few such institutions 
having the broadest range of income distribution (Freeman, 2008).   
 
Discrimination 
Blanchard (1996) found that in tight labour markets firms will not 
discriminate against the long-term unemployed, but in depressed 
labour markets, they will.  This discrimination exists because over 
time workers will lose skills.  The short-term unemployed therefore 
do not require any training before taking up work, however, the long-
term unemployed will cost more to employ by the firm.  Blanchard 
calculated that if unemployment rates are below 10%, firms do not 
discriminate against the long-term unemployed.  However, as 
unemployment exceeds this level, firms begin to discriminate, for 
25 
 
example if unemployment rate is 20%, the chance of the long-term 
unemployed being hired drops to only 57% (Blanchard, 1996, P.10).   
 
Blanchard’s findings are very interesting and could be applied on a 
micro-economic level, i.e. the long-term unemployed in areas with 
already high levels of unemployment will face higher levels of 
discrimination by employers who only seek workers who still have 
up-to-date work skills.  Recent UK economic figures will also be of 
concern.  As the recession continues through 2009, the employment 
rate for April to June decreased to 72.7% and the official 
unemployment rate for this period rose to 7.8%, and seems to be 
continuing on an upward trend.   
 
Despite Blanchard’s mathematical predications, ceteris paribus, one 
would assume that at any level of unemployment, the long-term 
unemployed would always face discrimination on the grounds of 
having lost their skills.     
 
Labour market supply-side factors: 
Educational issues 
Research suggests a major barrier to gaining employment lies in 
education and skills issues faced by the unemployed, i.e. that they 
lack the qualifications or level of education required, and/or lack the 
marketable skills required to carry out the jobs in the UK labour 
market.   
 
Clark and Layard (1989) argued that unemployment is created by a 
“mismatch” between job vacancies and the unemployed.  This 
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mismatch is due a lack of relevant skills or changes in the skills 
needed by companies.   
 
Evidence for mismatch can be found in recent figures suggesting 
widespread educational failure.  Disturbing figures are easy to come 
by with the 2008 GCSE pass rate of 65.7% at grades A* to C.  This 
means that with the overall pass rate of 98.2%, 32.5% of GCSE 
passes were below grade C.  Given that educational standards are 
seen as a proxy for ability, effort and knowledge learnt, this means 
32.5% of school leavers are failing to achieve basic levels of 
education.     
 
Levels of illiteracy and innumeracy will also play a part in long-term 
unemployment, especially as job roles become increasingly 
complex.  According to UN figures, the UK has a 99.0% adult 
literacy rate (% aged 15 and older from 1995 – 2005) (UNDP, 
2008).  However more accurate figures have been collected by the 
Department for Education and Skills.  Table 2.1 below shows that, 
although only 3% of the workforce could be described as illiterate, 
16% of the workforce, or 5.2 million people have only entry levels of 
literacy, i.e. equivalent to a primary school leaver.   
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Table 2.1:  Literacy levels among 16 to 65-year-olds in England 
     Equivalent to  
Level %  Number   
Entry level 1 or below 3 1.1m National 
curriculum level 1 
Entry level 2 2 0.6m Level expected 
of a seven-year-
old (national 
curriculum level 
2) 
Entry level 3 11 3.5m Level expected 
of an 11-year-old 
(national 
curriculum levels 
3-4) 
(All entry level or below) 16 5.2m  
Level 1 40 12.6m GCSE grades D-
G (national 
curriculum level 
5) 
Level 2 or above 44 14.1m GCSE grades A-
C (national 
curriculum levels 
6-8) 
Source: Skills for Life national needs and impact survey, 
DfES, 2003 
 
 
Although these figures are unlikely to correlate with those for LTU 
due to some elementary roles not requiring literacy or numeracy, the 
figures still suggest that at least 16% of the workforce is excluded 
from most intermediate level roles, for example, working in a call 
centre or as a cashier in a bank.     
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Physical and mental health issues 
Evidence seems to suggest that not only are physical and mental 
health issues a contributing factor to LTU, unemployment and 
forced idleness themselves also create health issues.  In the words 
of Fineman (1990, Pg. vii), “A life-drama unfolds as joblessness 
snaps the threads of personal relationships and tosses individuals to 
the margins of society”. As Fineman later explains, we so often 
identify ourselves individually and collectively by our employment, 
and we use it to define our success, status, solidarity and sanity.  In 
his 1986 study of the unemployed in Birmingham, Fineman found 
that psychological problems and psychosomatic illnesses were 
commonly diagnosed amongst the long-term unemployed (1990, 
Pg. 21).  Using various sources including The Health Divide by 
Whitehead (1987), he concludes: 
 
1. “The unemployed generally have poorer physical health than 
the employed.  This includes more diseases of the heart and 
respiratory tract. 
2. There is a higher death-rate amongst the unemployed.   
3. Suicide and attempted suicide is greater amongst the 
unemployed.  
4. In the period leading up to job loss, and subsequent to the 
event, the unemployed may make more visits to the GP.  The 
threat of job loss is particularly stressful.   
5. For most people, psychological health deteriorates during 
unemployment, and picks up on re-employment; but 
sometimes not without leaving psychological scars.  A minority 
of people show gains in mental health following 
unemployment.   
6. Unemployment can lead to family tension, marital stress, and 
difficulties for children.  The wife of an unemployed bread-
winner has to continue to management of the family on much 
slimmer resources, while also adjusting to a shift of roles in 
the family.  She may also have to take up a poorly paid job to 
supplement the family’s income.  The role change for the 
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bread-winner can be difficult too: coping with a loss of status 
and identity.   
7. Regular social and emotional support from relatives and 
friends helps to ease the stresses and practical difficulties of 
life.  The unemployed have few such contacts. 
8. The unemployed, particularly the long-term jobless, have very 
high rates of smoking, and many unemployed men drink to 
levels which endanger health” (Fineman, 1987, Pg. 24).  
 
More recently, Elaine Kempson’s (1996) study funded by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation into the effects of poverty and social 
exclusion found that health was likely to be compromised by the 
unemployed and those on low incomes cutting down their use of 
fuel and water.  The use of pre-payment meters to budget is seen to 
contribute further to this as the costs were higher and there existed 
the ever present danger of running out of money to feed the meter.  
The increased use of water meters was also leading to people 
avoiding using water even for essential purposes.  Finally, the 
recession of the late 80s/early 90s had led to many evictions with 
many families being re-housed in damp and unhealthy 
accommodation on crime-ridden estates.  This inevitably took its toll 
on physical and mental health (Kempson, 1996).   
 
This evidence suggests that once unemployed, individuals are far 
more likely to suffer physical and psychological health issues which 
affect their employability, and thus lead to an increased risk of being 
trapped in LTU.   
 
Suffering from a long-term disability also seems to play a major role 
in creating and maintaining unemployment.  For example, 
Oppenheim and Harker (1996) suggest that high rates of poverty 
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amongst the disabled are partly due to labour market exclusion and 
marginalisation.  This is echoed by Alcock (1997) who believes that 
exclusion is caused by a society which discriminates against those 
with a disability: through active discrimination or by failing to provide 
the necessary facilities and resources.  Alcock says: 
“In the case of disability it is very much a case of non-reaction 
leading to problems for persons with disabilities.  Modern industrial 
societies, and even modern welfare states, have largely been 
constructed on the basis that the people who inhabit them, who 
produce and reproduce them and benefit from them, are able-
bodied.  This is true of workplaces, public and private buildings, 
transport systems, information and telecommunication networks, 
retail outlets – indeed almost all venues for social interaction” 
(Alcock, 1997 cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 2004).   
 
These assertions are further supported by the work of Agulnick et al. 
(2002), who calculated that, between the mid-1980s to the late 
1990s, on average around 40% of all disabled persons were 
unemployed.  This was far higher than the average figures of 
unemployment amongst able-bodied persons at the time.  
 
Incentive issues 
It has been argued that, by providing welfare benefits such as Job 
Seeker’s Allowance, the government not only reduces the incentives 
for saving and thus capital accumulation, but also creates moral 
hazard (Barr, 2004) and the problem of welfare dependency.  One 
of the arguments is that a high replacement rate, i.e. the ratio of 
income received when unemployed compared to post tax and 
transfer income in work, will lead to those in low paid employment 
being worse off than those on benefits thus creating an 
‘unemployment trap’ whereby unemployed individuals have little 
incentive to actively seek work instead of remaining on benefits.  
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The Department for Social Security (the DSS, the fore-runner of the 
Department for Work and Pensions) summed it up thus: ‘When 
increases in benefits narrow between in-work and out-of-work 
incomes, work becomes less attractive; the effect is to encourage 
dependency,’ (DSS, 1997, Pg. 52).  In 2000/2001, the DSS found 
that 7% of the workforce faced replacement rates of 70% and over 
with Income Support (IS) (DSS, 2001, Pg. 13).   
 
The argument that high replacement rate dis-incentivises is not 
without its problems. There are statistical problems; for example, 
individual labour supply is often a function of household joint 
decisions; measurement problems, i.e. the interaction of tax and 
benefit systems makes it difficult to estimate benefits accurately; 
unobserved individual characteristics may influence both the level of 
benefit and the probability of accepting a particular job offer, e.g. if I 
am lazy (an unobserved individual characteristic), I may have a poor 
employment history and be less keen to accept a new job (Barr, 
2004). 
 
Another strand of research (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; 
Layard et al. 1991; Atkinson 1995a) uses a wider spectrum to 
examine the institutional differences that may explain why some 
countries experience higher levels of LTU.  They focused on three 
aspects of the labour market: 
1. Other aspects of the benefit system other than the 
replacement rate, e.g. the maximum duration of benefits, 
qualification conditions for benefit, the proportion of the 
unemployed receiving benefit, and the stringency with which 
the ‘actively-seeking-work’ condition is enforced.   
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2. What active labour mark policies are in place? E.g. 
counselling and placement services, training and job creation. 
3. What is the structure of the labour market? E.g. the power of 
trade unions and the extent of centralised wage bargaining.   
 
Atkinson et al. reached the conclusion that although the 
replacement rate does contribute to the problem, participation in the 
labour market is also influenced by other aspects of the benefit 
system, especially the maximum duration for which benefit can be 
received (Barr, 2004).   
 
Others concur that the duration of benefits is important. Walsh 
(1987) argues that , “the amount of time for which benefits are paid 
is an altogether more important potential determinant of 
unemployment duration patterns” (p. 78).  Walsh gives support to 
this argument with statistics from Belgium which at the time paid 
unemployment benefits indefinitely, and consequently had the worst 
record for LTU with 58.9% of all unemployed being so for longer 
than 12 months.  He contrasts this with the USA which had the 
weakest benefit support, and also the lowest proportion of LTU.  
Thus he concludes that LTU has a strong correlation with benefit 
direction.  
 
Academics such as the American sociologist Charles Murray argue 
that the provision of generous welfare benefits not only creates 
‘welfare dependency’, but can in fact lead to the creation of an entire 
underclass.  He writes: 
“When I use the term ‘underclass’ I am indeed focusing on a certain 
type of poor person defined not by his condition, e.g. long-term 
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unemployed, but by his deplorable behaviour in response to that 
condition, e.g. unwilling to take the jobs that are available to 
him…Britain has a growing population of working-aged, healthy 
people who live in a different world from other Britons, who are 
raising their children to live in it, and whose values are 
contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods…for neighbours 
who do not share those values cannot isolate themselves” (Murray, 
1989 cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 2004, p.268).   
 
Murray also links this ‘deplorable behaviour’ with increasing 
criminality (discussed later in this chapter) and illegitimacy amongst 
this underclass.  According to Murray  therefore, the problem rests 
with the sub-culture and attitudes which creates an unwillingness to 
work and that, while in older generations of working class males 
there was an understanding of the stigma attached to receiving 
benefits, younger males were happy to live off welfare handouts.  
Murray found: 
 “talking to the boys in their late teens and early twenties about jobs, 
I heard nothing about the importance of work as a source of self-
respect and no talk of just earning enough income to be free of the 
benefit system” (Murray, 1989 cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 
2004, p. 269).   
 
Murray returned to the UK in 1993 and 1999 and argued that the 
problems of a growing underclass were getting much worse (Murray 
1993, 2001).  Although overall unemployment was down between 
1989 and 1999, amongst 18-24 year old males it had increase from 
20.5% to 31.2% (Murray 2001).  He also found that violent crime 
had increased to levels surpassing the US, and rates of illegitimacy 
had increased to levels near to those of the US.   
He concludes:  
“Over the last two decades, larger and larger numbers of British 
children have not been socialised to norms of self-control, 
consideration for others, and the concept that actions have 
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consequences” (Murray 2001 cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 
2004, p. 270).   
 
 
Charles Murray is not without his critics.  Walker (1990) argues that 
Murray’s claims blame the victim, are supported by inadequate 
evidence, and that Murray relies upon ‘innuendos, assertions and 
anecdotes’ (cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 2004, Pg. 270).  
Walker argues that, rather than having their own subculture of 
dependency, most of the so-called underclass has conventional 
attitudes; they want stable relationships and paid employment.  It is 
not their values that prevent this, but a lack of opportunities due to 
failures of government policy (Walker, 1990), i.e. a lack of training 
and welfare-to-work opportunities.  
 
Heath (1990), using information from the British Election Survey of 
1987 and the British Social Attitudes Survey of 1989, tested the 
claim that attitudes of the underclass are different.  He found that 
86% of the underclass said they would like to have paid 
employment compared to only 57% in those families where at least 
one person was in paid employment (Health, 1990).  He also found 
that the underclass had similar attitudes to marriage as ‘normal’ 
people with 22% agreeing that ‘married people are generally 
happier than unmarried people” compared to 25% in employed 
family units.  However, they were less likely to agree ‘people who 
want children ought to get married’ with 47% vs. 64% (Heath, 1990). 
 
Alcock (1994) criticised Murray following his 1994 article.  Alcock 
believes Murray makes sweeping generalisations about the 
negative effects of single parenthood.  Alcock argues: “Most of the 
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unemployed, the perpetrators of crime and the cohabiting (or not) 
parents of illegitimate children come from what must appear from all 
the evidence to be stable, married, family relationships” (Alcock, 
1994, cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 2004, Pg. 272).   
 
In addition to this, Alcock argues that individuals do not make 
decisions based solely on economic grounds.  This viewpoint 
counters Murrays claim that by reducing benefits individuals will 
immediately want to, or even be able to take up paid employment.  
As Alcock explains, “first-year sociology students soon learn that all 
the decisions we make, or think we make, are structured by a range 
of social, cultural and economic forces within which we move but 
without which we cannot step” (Alcock, 1994, cited in Haralambos 
and Holborn, 2004, p. 272). 
 
Given what Alcock suggests, it could be argued that individuals 
cannot be fully blamed for their actions.  That although what may 
appear to be a display of rational rent-seeking behaviour when for 
example workers trade poorly paid employment for benefits with a 
high-replacement rate.   That they may in fact be doing is simply 
acting out the deterministic outcome of their socialisation.  As 
Murray has effectively argued, when a sub-culture exists that does 
not place a priority on gaining paid employment, individuals who are 
part of that sub-culture will simply be victims of it and other 
circumstances such as a poor education system or perverse 
incentives created by the welfare state and economic system.  
Given the evidence presented on either side of the agency/structure 
debate, the present author would be tempted to take a line between 
the extremes: that despite being surrounded by various influences in 
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our culture and day-to-day interactions, unless we have been 
socialised to be completely whimsical and to act by caprice alone, it 
is still ultimately up to each and every one of us as to how we react, 
i.e. that even if we are surrounded by individuals who place little 
value on personal responsibility, a person could still make a rational 
decision to try to find work.  Sub-culture presents no proverbial gun 
to his head saying he must avoid work.  Given this, society and the 
state must be clear in its intentions and ensure that there are no 
perverse incentives; that all roads ultimately lead to work and that 
being LTU is not a possible lifestyle choice.   
 
Search behaviour 
Walsh (1987) said of job searches: 
“Of course this prolonged job search might not necessarily be a 
negative factor.  The more thorough search might mean that the 
person finds more suitable employment that does not result in 
repeated spells of unemployment simply because jobs are 
discovered to be unsuitable after a short while.  Equally there might 
be advantages for employers in getting the right people.  So, the 
compensation paid to the unemployed in thorough job search might 
be money well spent if it helps to make the labour market more 
efficient.” (Walsh, 1987, Pg 80).   
 
This argument is relevant to both LTU and repeat JSA claims, and 
makes a strong case for there being the facility for job seeker’s to 
spend an extended period seeking the most suitable employment.  
This would, in theory, reduce the incidence of ‘mismatch’.  However, 
this raises question of where to draw the line; are benefits to be 
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received indefinitely until the ‘perfect’ job comes along?  Also, what 
if a worker has just lost his/her job from the last pottery in the UK 
thus making his skill-set obsolete; is s/he to wait until a new pottery 
opens before s/he can again work in that specialised field?   Despite 
Walsh’s argument, it might be argued that the unemployed must 
have some degree of flexibility when seeking new work, and the 
longer they have been unemployed, the more flexible they should 
have until the point where they should accept any job offered to 
them.   
 
Åberg (2001) argues that most of all getting a job is associated with 
relative qualifications, recall expectations and local labour market 
conditions and not with search behaviour or high wage demands.   
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Geographical mobility 
It could be argued that a major factor contributing to LTU in the UK, 
especially outside of London and the south east is unreliable, slow and 
expensive public transport.  This reduces labour mobility and results in 
the unemployed being unable to travel to possible work opportunities, 
and thus become LTU.  Below (Table 2.2) is a simple comparison of the 
neighbouring UK districts of Pendle and Craven.  Pendle is poorly 
served by slow Class 142 ‘Pacer’ Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs) which 
are over 20 years old running on the single East Lancashire Branch-line 
which can only accommodate an hourly service.  Craven is served via 
the Airedale Line using high-speed modern Class 333 Electric Multiple 
Units (EMUs) introduced in 2000.   
 
Table 2.2: Comparison of journey times and claimant counts 
 
From Journey time 
to Leeds via 
rail 
Journey time 
to 
Manchester 
via rail 
Claimant 
count 
% of working 
age 
population 
Borough of 
Pendle 
2 hours 49 
mins with 2 
changes 
1 hour 51 
mins with 1 
change 
2,045 3.7 
Borough of 
Craven 
40 mins with 
no changes 
1 hour 48 
mins with 1 
change 
644 2 
Source: Network Rail and the ONS (2009)  
 
The difference in journey times and the claimant count is stark and 
suggests a strong relationship between geographical mobility and 
unemployment in this case.  However, further research would be needed 
to confirm the validity and reliability of this relationship.
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Summary    
This chapter has examined the labour market demand and supply side 
factors contributing to long term unemployment in the UK.  This has 
included examining the effects of skills and education levels, physical and 
mental health issues, incentive issues, search behaviour and geographical 
mobility. 
 
Conclusion 
What comes out of the literature is a complex interaction between many of 
these factors and issues which conspire to create barriers to employment 
for the long-term unemployed.  Even though one of these barriers could 
make employment less likely, two or more factors, and especially a long-
term physical or mental health issue could make employment near 
impossible.   
 
LTU and recycling 
Chapter 3 of this work will examine the factors contributing to ‘recycling’, 
many of which are closely related to those contributing to LTU.  
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Chapter 3 
Contributing factors to the ‘recycling’ of Job Seeker’s 
Allowance claimants 
 
‘Recycling’ 
Between 1 July 2003 and 30 June 2004, 1,152,330 individuals who 
claimed Job Seeker’s Allowance had made at least one claim in the 
preceding four years: this is 54% of all JSA claimants.   The average 
number of previous claims in these four years was three claims with a 
mean average length of three months.  The level  of recycling has been 
extremely worrying with an “increasing concentration of unemployment 
within a challenging client group who repeatedly claim JSA without finding 
sustained employment between claims; the majority of those commencing 
a new JSA claim are repeat claimants (54 per cent between July 2003 and 
June 2004)” (Carpenter,  2006).  The problem known as ‘recycling’ has not 
been widely researched in the UK.  The majority of useful data can be 
found in Carpenter (2006) in her DWP Research Report No. 394 entitled 
‘Repeat Job Seeker’s Allowance Spells’.  This report, a survey of many 
repeat claimants, yielded a great deal of valuable information regarding 
repeat claimants including the data in tables 3.1 and 3.2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
41 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of repeat claimant population 
Number of previous JSA claims in last four years: % 
One 33 
Two  22 
Three-four 25 
Five or more 20 
Whether been on DWP programme in the last four years 38 
Whether been on other (non-JSA) benefit in the last four 
years 26 
Base: Repeat claimants who made a claim between July 
2003 and June 2004 1,152,330 
Source of data: Carpenter (2006).   
 
 
Table 3.2 Age and gender profile of repeat claimants, compared with 
Jobseeker’s Allowance flows as a whole 
Gender 
Repeat 
claimants (%) 
JSA flow 
population (%) 
Male 75 72 
Female 25 28 
Age 
Under 
25 27 38 
25-49 58 49 
50+  15 13 
Source of data: Carpenter (2006).   
 
This survey also identified two common scenarios for temporary work: the 
first is where the individual’s work history and other barriers restrict them to 
temporary, low skilled work; and the second is that despite having better 
employment prospects, the individual has become trapped in a cycle of 
temporary employment (Carpenter, 2006).   
 
This chapter will examine this key problem of ‘recycling’.  It will do so by 
examining the demand-side factors and supply-side factors in the labour 
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market, and how these interact leading to workers becoming trapped in this 
cycle temporary employment. 
 
Carpenter (2006) found three patterns common among repeat claimants:  
• A cycle of temporary work interspaced with periods on JSA.  Many 
repeat claimants moved into work fairly quickly, but only into 
temporary employment. 
• Longer-term unemployment.  This was in some cases prompted by 
redundancy but also relates to employment background: those with a 
history of unemployment tended to remain unemployed, and this is 
often compounded by a lack of qualifications and confidence in 
finding work.   
• Health problems and/or disabilities were also likely to cause long-
term absence from the labour market. 
The report also identified all those who had made a repeat claims for JSA 
in 2003 (1,152,330 individuals).  These were then put into groups based on 
a number of factors (see table 3.3 and 3.4 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Group definitions for repeat JSA claimants 
Group Number 
of 
claimants 
% of 
total 
Description Number 
of 
previous 
JSA 
spells 
Spells 
on 
other 
benefits 
DWP 
programmes 
1 100,236 9 Long time 
on other 
programmes 
One or 
more 
No Yes, more 
than one 
year 
2 197,290 17 Short time 
on other 
programmes 
One or 
more 
No Yes, less 
than one 
year 
3 142,588 12 Programmes 
and other 
benefits 
One or 
more 
Yes Yes (Any) 
4 154,747 13 Other 
benefits 
One or 
more 
Yes No 
5 302,932 26 More than 
one 
previous 
JSA claim, 
no 
programmes 
or other 
benefits 
Two or 
more 
No No 
6 254,537 22 Just one 
previous 
JSA claim, 
no 
programmes 
or other 
benefits 
One only No No 
Total: 1,152,330      
Source: Carpenter (2006) 
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Table 3.4: Profile of groups: Repeat JSA spells 
Column 
percentages 
Total Long time on 
programmes 
(Group 1) 
Short time on 
programmes 
(Group 2) 
Programmes 
and other 
benefits 
(Group 3) 
Other 
benefits 
(Group 4) 
Two or 
more 
previous 
claims 
(Group 5) 
One 
previous 
claim 
(Group 6) 
Number of 
previous JSA 
spells 
       
1 33 10 20 15 35 0 100 
2 - 4 47 51 55 42 47 78 0 
5 - 10 18 35 23 20 17 20 0 
11 + 2 4 1 3 2 2 0 
Mean number of 
JSA spells 
3.0 4.5 3.4 4.0 2.9 3.6 1 
Mean total number 
of months on JSA 
12 27 16 20 7 9 3 
        
Mean length of 
individual JSA 
spells 
       
Less than 12 weeks 46 12 20 21 55 65 66 
12 weeks - less 
than six months 
32 37 43 40 31 27 23 
Six months - less 
than one year 
16 29 28 26 11 7 8 
One year or more 6 23 9 13 3 1 2 
        
Base: All repeat 
claimants 
(1,152,330) 
              
Source: Carpenter (2006) 
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Using this preliminary data, we can begin to explore the factors which 
conspire to create a cycle of repeat JSA claims.   
 
Labour market demand-side factors: 
De-industrialisation and structural change 
72% of respondents in Carpenter (2006) who made three or more JSA claims 
said that the reason for the multiple claims was that they had not been able to 
find ‘suitable’ work.  The problem therefore appears to be the kind of work 
available rather than not being able to find work at all. 
 
67% moved into work when their last JSA spell ended, and the 41 were in 
work at the time of the survey.  This work was, however, not sustained 
employment and Carpenter identified a strong link between temporary 
employment and repeat JSA claims:  41% of those with three or more claims 
said that a main reason for the repeat claims was that they could only get 
temporary work, and 33 per cent of respondents said the reason they last left 
employment was because a temporary job had ended.  Only 53 per cent said 
that their most recent job was permanent (Carpenter 2006).  The reason for 
these results may be the changing structure of the UK economy as discussed 
in Chapter 2, i.e. there being a move away from low-skilled manual jobs in 
manufacturing and industry, and a move away from full-time permanent 
positions towards more flexible working practices which allow firms to take on 
or let go of labour according to their demand for labour at the time.  This 
reduces the firm’s costs and thus makes them more competitive; however, 
this will have inevitable social costs for those who are frequently taken on 
then made redundant.  These individuals will have no choice but to claim JSA 
between periods of temporary work.   
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Discrimination 
Although illegal and in the opinion of the present author, morally wrong, 
Carpenter (2006) found evidence of discrimination on the grounds of age, 
health, disability and race:  24% of respondents said that they were unlikely to 
get a job because of their age; 74% of those fifty years old and over believed 
their aged made it unlikely they would get another job.  Also, concerns about 
‘other people’s prejudices’ was expressed regularly by non-white 
respondents, and those with health problems and/or disabilities (p. 50).   
 
These figures are of great concern as social groups which may already suffer 
social marginalisation are also being economically marginalised.  Further 
research would be required to ensure greater validity to the claim that repeat 
claimants are being discriminated against because of their age, race, or state 
of physical and mental health and to establish that these figures are not the 
result of a misplaced sense of victimhood.  Such research would however be 
difficult to achieve as employers would not wish to be labelled ‘racist’, even if 
they are.   
 
 
 
Labour market supply-side factors: 
Educational issues 
As seen with long-term unemployment, a lack of education is also prominent 
in repeat JSA claims.  Carpenter (2006) has found that repeat claimants 
without qualifications and with basic skills needs had more difficulty in finding 
sustained work.  Of repeat claimants, 23% had no qualifications and 17% had 
literacy and/or numeracy problems.  This lack of marketable skills and/or 
qualifications therefore appears to be a major factor leading to LTU and/or 
repeat JSA claims.  It limit jobs applicants to roles that require only basic 
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manual skills, thus making good levels of physical and mental health even 
more important.  Given the changing structure of the UK economy such as 
de-industrialisation and the move towards an information-based economy and 
the increase in high-tech jobs discussed earlier, the employment 
opportunities open to unskilled and uneducated workers may continue to 
decline.   
 
The 2009 IPPR report “Nice work if you can get it” has however argued that 
lacking qualifications is not in any way a barrier to employment as the 
projected number of low-skilled jobs which require no qualifications to enter 
(7.4 million) will be the same in 2020 as it was in 2006.  The number of 
economically active adults with no qualifications seeking these jobs is around 
a third of this figure.   
 
Criminal history 
Carpenter (2006) found that 8% of repeat claimants reported problems with 
crime.  This may present itself as a barrier to employment as employers will 
inevitably prefer ‘trustworthy’ and ‘dependable’ individuals.  However, under 
the provision of The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, job applicants do 
not have to disclose certain convictions after a certain period of time, i.e. after 
they have become ‘spent’.  Depending on the nature of the offence, some 
roles would be completely ruled out, i.e. an individual convicted of a sexual 
offence would not be able to get a role working with children and other 
vulnerable individuals.   
 
What could present a problem to individuals with a criminal history is 
explaining a gap in their work history if they served a custodial sentence.  
This may require explanation to the employer during application or at 
interview, and would most likely reduce their chances of gaining employment.   
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Work history 
As well as being repeat claimants of JSA, respondents in Carpenter (2006) 
demonstrated difficulty in holding down employment (Table 3.5).  Of those 
who gave a specific reason for leaving their last employment, 57% left their 
last job due to involuntary reasons.  10% were dismissed or sacked and 9% 
left because they “did not like it”.  It would have been useful to know why the 
10% were sacked / dismissed: e.g. was it due to their being awful at the job or 
perhaps even deliberately creating the situation where they could return to 
claiming JSA?  The 9% who did not like the job again deserve further study: 
was it that particular job, perhaps a skills mismatch, or are these particular 
individuals just work-shy?    
 
Table 3.5: Reasons for leaving last job 
Reasons: Total % 
Temporary job ended 33 
Made redundant 16 
Dismissed/sacked 10 
Became ill/injured and had to leave 8 
Left because I did not like it 9 
  
Base: All respondents who have left 
a job 
2,627 
 
Other important findings were that over 25% of repeat claimants had 
experienced their benefits being stopped or reduced, and 7% said a sanction 
was the reason their last JSA claim ended.  Sanctioning by the DWP was 
itself contributes to additional JSA spells and was no impacting the financial 
stability of claimants.   
 
Search behaviour 
Search behaviour is important to the unemployed finding work.  72% of 
respondents in Carpenter (2006) who had made at least three claims for JSA 
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said they had not been able to find ‘suitable’ work.  41% of these repeat 
claimants said they had only been able to find short-term work.  This 
suggests that repeat claimants are performing badly in their search for work, 
or that given their poor proposition to the job market, they struggle to find 
suitable full-time employment suitable for them.   
 
How well or badly an individual performs in their search for work seems to 
depend on confidence, ability and determination.  Carpenter (2006) found 
19% said their confidence was low, 27% rated their chances of getting a job 
as poor, 40% said that getting a job was more down to luck than effort, 90% 
were determined to find work, 18% of repeat claimants were negative in some 
way with those under 25 with basic skills problems most likely to have a less 
positive attitude towards work and the vast majority thought they would be (or 
were) better off financially in work than on benefits.  This interesting set of 
data leads us to believe that the majority of repeat claimants know they would 
be better off in work, want to find work but alienated from the labour market 
and struggle to stay positive and motivated during long periods out of work.   
 
Carpenter (2006) also found that 8% said they did not much care whether 
they worked or not, and that although 61% of those out of work had applied 
for ten or more jobs in the last six months, 6% had applied for no jobs, 2% 
applied for one job, 13% applied for two to four jobs and that 16% applied for 
five to nine jobs.  To find out why this was the case Carpenter asked those 
who had applied to only one or no jobs why, 21% claimed there were not 
enough suitable jobs, 9% claimed there were no/few jobs available, 22% had 
health problems, 8% were looking after family and 6% were still in full-time 
education.  These figures regarding search behaviour and the spurious 
reasons given for not applying for more jobs are very worrying.  Within 6 
months, to be only able to find and apply for less than ten ‘suitable’ roles to 
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which to apply to shows a distinct lack of effort and/or flexibility on the part of 
many of these repeat JSA claimants.   
  
Of repeat claimants, 12.5% found their last job through a programme.  The 
longer they spent on a programme, the more likely they were to find work 
through it rather than independently (Carpenter, 2006).  This suggests that 
welfare-to-work programmes can be useful in finding work, most probably due 
to their close supervision and support to the jobless.   
 
Finally, Carpenter (2006) found that over a third of repeat claimants said they 
had been in contact with a private employment agency, and this was more 
common among those who had been in temporary rather than full 
employment.  This may be part in due to the increasing commissioning of 
private employment agencies by DWP to find work for the unemployed and 
does raise questions as to how effective these agencies are in finding 
sustained employment for the unemployed.  
 
Carpenter also found that although 6% of respondents said they preferred 
short-term work, 41 % said they were only able to get short-term work. This 
may again be due to increasing use of employment agencies which supply 
short-term temporary workers to companies.    
 
 
Physical and mental health issues  
297,355 individuals or 25% of repeat claimants had also received other 
benefits:  82% received Incapacity Benefit (IB) and 77% received Income 
Support (IS) and (Carpenter, 2006).  55% claimed both IB and income 
support (IS) (Carpenter 2006) and those in this group were more likely to 
have suffered long-term health or on-going problems. This may be indicative 
of short-term health problems contributing heavily to repeat JSA claims.   
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However, IB can be claimed for a broad range of health problems including 
such subjective conditions as stress, depression and backache.  7% of the 
working age population were on incapacity or other sickness benefits in 1999 
(Bartholomew, 2006).  In May 2002 there were 2.4 million individuals claiming 
incapacity benefits with 819,000 suffering ‘mental and behavioural disorders’ 
which includes ‘stress’, and 525,000 with ‘diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system and connective tissue’ which includes backache.  These two 
categories made up for over 56% of claims.  As Bartholomew (2006) points 
out this compares with 9,800 suffering from diseases of the ear, which is an 
easily verifiable condition.  He also notes that the highest levels of claims for 
IB were in areas with high unemployment, and that backache is suspiciously 
common when wages are low compared to IB and associated benefits.  
Some of the areas with the highest claimant rates for IB were Merthyr Tydfil 
with 26.9%, Easington with 26.2%, Glasgow with 20.7%, Blaenau Gwent with 
19.8% and Liverpool with 18.9% (Bartholomew, 2006).   
 
These statistics would therefore tend to suggest that although in a minority of 
cases, serious short-term and longer-term health issues can contribute to 
repeat JSA claims, it does tend also to suggest that in areas where work 
opportunities may be limited, and high levels of unemployment have placed 
downward pressure on wages thus increasing the replacement rate of 
benefits to wages, a worryingly large amount of individuals are manipulating 
the system claiming to have fictional illnesses to avoid work.  This would no 
doubt be difficult to prove conclusively, but it would warrant further research.   
 
Carpenter (2006), in her survey of repeat JSA spells found that 3% of 
respondents had drug and alcohol problems.  Although there is an 
increasingly more prominent problem of excessive binge drinking (NHS 2006) 
with 25% of males and 10% of females regularly drinking above the 
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recommended daily amounts, the evidence would suggest that alcoholism is 
a limited but intense problem that may contribute to repeat JSA claims in a 
small minority.   
 
Regarding drug misuse, this figure is again low compared to the wider 
population where in 2005/2006, 10.5% of adults reported using one of more 
illicit drugs in the previous year (NHS 2009).  However, as with alcohol a 
serious addiction to some substances would result in individuals losing their 
jobs or being unable secure new work.  As well as the psychological and 
financial problems associated with drug misuse, there is also a strong link 
with criminality, again creating further barriers to work.  
 
Homelessness 
Carpenter (2006) found that 14% of repeat claimants had no permanent place 
to live.  Compared to average levels of the time, there were 19,430 
acceptances of homelessness by local authorities during the April - June 
quarter 2006 (ONS) and the population was roughly 60,587,400 at the time 
(ONS) giving a figure 0.03% of the population.  14% is therefore vastly higher 
than the average for the wider population.  This will place tremendous strain 
on individuals seeking work, especially as gaining employment may then 
make claimants ineligible for housing benefit and other financial support.  
Individuals may well find themselves trapped in temporary accommodation 
and on JSA.   
 
Incentive and financial stability issues  
12.5% of respondents to Carpenter (2006) said they experienced financial 
problems which they said made it difficult for them to find or keep a job.  
12.5% also said that benefits provided a more stable income than 
employment (this was often those with who have been LTU or have 
programme experience).  This would suggest that repeat JSA claimants 
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become trapped by the high replacement rate of JSA and the stable income it 
offers compared to the low-level jobs such workers would be able to secure.   
 
Carpenter (2006) claims “there is little evidence in the survey to suggest that 
recycling is due to personal choice.  The findings consistently indicate an 
inability to find sustained employment rather than a choice to avoid it.  The 
vast majority said that they would have preferred to spend more of their life in 
work”, and yet then says in the same paragraph “Just ten per cent of 
respondents who did not have a background of steady work said that they 
would not rather have spent more time in work” (2006, Pg 3).  Carpenter’s 
use of the word ‘just’ implies something of insignificance, however, 10% of 
respondents wishing to avoid being in work as much as possible is significant 
and does on the contrary to Carpenter’s claims, imply some level of personal 
choice to recycling for at least 10% of respondents.  In support of this, as 
mentioned earlier, 39% of respondents had applied for less than ten jobs in 6 
months.  This lacklustre attempt to find work by nearly 40% of respondents 
again implies a strong degree of personal choice in not seeking to improve 
their situation and get off JSA.   
 
Childcare issues 
11% of repeat claimants had dependent children and the vast majority of 
these said their child’s needs of childcare issues made it difficult to work or 
work longer hours (Carpenter, 2006).  They did not claim that having children 
created an insurmountable barrier to employment.  It was found that 
respondents with children generally had a more stable work history than 
those without.  This may be due to them being focused on providing 
financially to support their child.   
 
9% of respondents provided care for others because of illness, disability, old 
age or infirmity.  25% of people within this group said that it affected the type 
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or amount of work (Carpenter, 2006).  Carpenter rightly concludes from the 
data that caring responsibilities have little major impact on claiming behaviour 
or work patterns.  It can be assumed that individuals in this position would be 
strongly supported by social services, charity and family, and that Disabled 
Living Allowance (DLA) would be paid to the individual being cared for and to 
help support those in a caring role.   
 
Geographical mobility 
Similar to LTU, the problem of geographical mobility can be seen as 
important to repeat claims as 54% of repeat claimants did not have a driving 
licence.  20% said they could not afford the cost of transport to work and 21% 
said travelling to work is/would be difficult (Carpenter 2006) thus limiting them 
to locally accessible job vacancies.  This is a drastic limitation on work 
opportunities and is no doubt a major cause of repeat JSA claimants as 
workers are unable to find suitable sustained employment further afield.  
 
Summary 
From the evidence thus presented it can be concluded that there is a strong 
link, and many common contributing factors between LTU and repeat JSA 
claims.  This is the same conclusion reached by Heather (2004), who found 
that repeat JSA claims are indicative of longer-term employment barriers.  
Carpenter (2006) makes similar claims that the majority of evidence suggests 
that the cycles of employment and JSA are the result of structural barriers 
rather than differences in the individual’s characteristics and their 
circumstances (labour market characteristics and individuals’ skill, 
perspectives, attitudes and behaviour).  The evidence does tend to support 
the argument that the structure in which individuals act to a large extent 
determines the options available to them.   However, no matter what the 
structure, there is still room to argue that individual agency plays a pivotal role 
as individuals are formed, and actively react to the structure around them.  
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This would therefore suggest that to address the problem of LTU and repeat 
JSA claims the government must tackle any perverse incentives which exist 
within the tax and benefits system, and address other structural barriers so as 
to encourage workers to make the choices which will ultimately lead them to 
long-term and sustained employment.  
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Chapter 4  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Summary of this work 
Chapter 1 of this work examined the UK welfare state and the debate 
surrounding welfarism in the UK. 
 
Chapter 2 examined the contributing factors towards LTU including the effect 
of skills, education, literacy, and incentive issues. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the contributing factors to repeat JSA claims including 
many, if not all of the same factors.  
 
Conclusions 
 It seems clear from the data and evidence that LTU and repeat JSA spells 
are symptoms of the same core problems: de-industrialisation and structural 
change, discrimination by employers, a lack of marketable skills and 
education (although the effect of this is debatable), criminality, poor work 
history, ineffective search behaviour driven by perverse incentives in the tax 
and benefit systems, physical and mental health issues, homelessness, a 
lack of financial independence and a lack of geographical mobility all conspire 
to create barriers to long-term and sustainable employment.    
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Recommendations 
This work has explored the contributing factors to LTU and repeat JSA 
claims.  Using the knowledge gained and conclusions reached, it can now 
begin to explore a number of possible public policy solutions to the problems 
of long-term unemployment and repeat claims of Job Seekers Allowance.   
 
Policy option 1: Do nothing 
The first and least appealing policy option is to do nothing.  However, given 
that 27.3% of the workforce is currently not in employment, and that 7.8% of 
the workforce is claiming Job Seeker’s Allowance as of the 12th August 2009 
(ONS), doing nothing is the least desirable option.   
 
Policy option 2: Increase the provision of educational courses and 
vocational training for the entire workforce 
As demonstrated earlier, poor educational attainment, a lack of transferable 
work-based skills, illiteracy and innumeracy can all present major barriers to 
sustained employment.  By increasing the funding for and the provision of 
educational courses and vocational training for the entire workforce, the 
government can ensure this barrier to employment is reduced.  This will also 
ensure that even if those currently in employment lose their jobs for whatever 
reason, they are able to quickly return to new employment.   
 
For the long-term unemployed and repeat JSA claimants, attendance at such 
courses could be made compulsory based on the educational requirements of 
the individuals concerned.  Such conditionality will thus force the less-than-
willing towards increasing their employability and tackle the incentive issues 
raised in Chapters 2 and 3.   
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Policy option 3: Linking benefits to school leavers to their performance 
at GCSE. 
With only 65.7% of GCSE results being grades A* - C, action to improve the 
educational standards of school-leavers is required.  This could be achieved 
by further increasing the conditionality of JSA for all new claimants who leave 
school from 2010 onwards, i.e. that to be eligible for benefits, individuals must 
achieve a minimum of 5 GCSEs grades A* - C.  Of course exceptions to this 
rule could be made for those with physical/mental health issues, and/or 
learning difficulties which would make such an achievement very difficult and 
thus unfair.  
 
Increasing the educational standards of school leavers by incentivising hard 
work while pupils are still in school will also decrease the number of those 
eligible for benefits on leaving, thus forcing them into work.   
 
Policy option 4: Tax reform to incentivise work 
Although the replacement rate is not seen as important as the length of time 
for which benefits are offered, it does play a minor role.  The level of benefits 
could be cut to increase the gap between the benefits and income; however, 
this would force many of the unemployed into the ‘poverty trap’.  An 
alternative to this would therefore be to offer benefits which are sufficient to 
give the unemployed a safety net, and at the same time to make being in 
work far more worthwhile, thus still lowering the replacement rate.  This might 
be achieved by dramatically increasing the tax-free allowance to perhaps 
£10,000 per annum, thus removing many of the working poor from income tax 
all together.  Also, increasing the minimum wage and linking it to inflation, 
abolishing tax on savings and pensions to encourage work and accumulation 
of savings, and exploring a flat tax system to encourage individuals in work to 
progress their careers.   
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Policy option 5: Time limits on Job Seeker’s Allowance 
As was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, the length of time for which an 
individual may claim unemployment benefits is strongly correlated to the 
incidence of LTU and repeat JSA claims.  Anecdotal evidence of what 
occurred after the implementation of the United State’s ‘Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996’ suggests 
that by placing a 2 year limit on each claim, and a lifetime limit of 5 years on 
unemployment benefits forced many of the long-term unemployed and repeat 
benefits claimants into work.  Although initially this has been low-paid work, 
this has soon been replaced by better paid jobs and participation in part-time 
education programmes.    
 
It would therefore seem appropriate to place time limits on the maximum 
duration for which individuals are eligible for unemployment benefits such as 
JSA, again with exceptions for the severely disabled and those for who work 
would be impossible.  Further research into what has occurred in the US 
would be required to establish causality.   
 
Policy option 6: Increasing the support for ex-prisoners and better 
rehabilitation in prisons 
The rehabilitation of prisoners is of vital importance to improve their 
employability, thus helping them into work and preventing re-offending.  
Rehabilitation must therefore begin from the moment prisoners are 
sentenced.  Learning difficulties and mental health problems must be 
identified early to ensure proper support.  The reason why individuals fell into 
crime should also be explored with them, and educational requirements 
discussed to ensure that remedial education can be given, tailored to their 
needs.  The granting of probation could also be linked to individuals having 
met the requirements of their rehabilitation plans, thus forcing prisoners to 
rehabilitate.  Upon a prisoner’s release, the probation service should then 
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work closely with the individual and the DWP to support the individual into 
work.   
 
To tackle the barrier presented by an individual’s criminal history, i.e. gaps in 
work history where an individual was incarcerated, time spent on work 
programmes may help to build up sufficient work history to negate the 
influence of the gap.  However, if an individual was involved in a violent crime 
or a crime involving vulnerable individuals, the safety of wider society must 
always take precedence.   
 
Policy option 7: Increasing the support substance abusers 
Extra support to alcohol and substance abusers is essential to increasing 
their employability.  Although a knee-jerk reaction could be to link seeking 
help with benefits, or cutting benefits as a punishment for re-lapses, this could 
ultimately prove counter-productive as addicts of any kind are prone to 
relapse.  Also, taking an addict’s benefit income away may merely force them 
into petty crime such as stealing and shoplifting, or onto much more serious 
offences such as mugging and burglary to support their addictions.  
Therefore, continued and long-term treatment through the NHS National 
Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse is essential. 
 
 
Policy option 8: Stricter enforcement of JSA requirements 
Job Seeker’s Allowance requires that individuals be capable of working, 
available for work, actively seeking work and below state pension age.  
Whether an individual is ‘actively seeking work’ is tested through a ‘diary’ they 
complete with their job-seeking activities; they must complete three activities 
per week.  It could therefore be argued that completing a mere three activities 
per week which may be anything from posting an application, attending an 
interview or simply saying that they looked for work in local papers they are 
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not as actively seeking employment as they could be.  They can also quite 
easily fake such activities or even attend job interviews and deliberately 
perform badly to ensure they do not get the jobs they have been sent to gain, 
therefore be not genuinely seeking work.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this does occur.  
 
It can therefore be said that the current system requires tightening, perhaps 
with personalised conditionality as advocated by Gregg (2008) to ensure that 
pressure is continually exerted on job seeker’s to increase their employability, 
seek suitable work and to take available work when offered.   
 
Policy option 9: Increasing geographical mobility 
As discussed earlier, limited geographical mobility limits the job opportunities 
with a commutable distance.  This could be addressed in a number of ways: 
• Relocation grants to help workers move once they have found new 
employment; 
• Financial aid towards the cost of learning to drive, given as a direct 
payment to driving instructors; 
• Free passes for use on public transport to get to job interviews, and 
during the first two months of a new job; and, 
• Radical improvements to the coverage, speed and reliability of transport 
infrastructure.  
A combination of one or all of these policy solutions might help to tackle the 
barriers presented by geographical mobility.  
 
 
Policy option 10: Seeking alternative routes into employment 
Alternative routes into employment could also be explored and exploited, for 
example supporting those working in the informal economy to become part of 
the formal economy through help with business and tax registration, extra 
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support towards training, etc. for the ‘employer’ concerned.  These processes 
could take place over a twelve month period so that organisations which were 
previously unregistered, unregulated and untaxed become part of the formal 
sector and create sustainable employment.   
 
Policy option 11: Making JSA an insurance-only scheme 
Another possible policy to reduce LTU and repeat JSA claims would be to 
make the JSA system insurance-only, i.e. scrap the JSA (IB) system so that 
only those who had paid into the system over a period of time would be 
eligible to claim through JSA (C).   
 
This course of action would drastically reduce the eligibility for JSA, thus 
forcing individuals to accept any employment they can find.  In theory, it 
would also make LTU impossible as contributions would soon be exhausted.  
The need for extra contributions from public funds would also be removed 
thus freeing up funding for other areas of public finance, or indeed for funding 
the other policies outlined here.  
 
On the negative side, this policy would be very controversial for such a drastic 
reduction in eligibility and the possible risks are economic marginalisation.   
 
Policy option 12: Tightening the definition of incapacity 
Long term health problems were seen as a key barrier to employment for 
both the long-term unemployed and repeat JSA claimants.  However, 
evidence did suggest that some individuals may be exploiting the system.   
 
Incapacity is commonly defined as defined as “deprived of strength or ability” 
(Makins, 1992).  Such a strict definition should be adopted when defining 
edibility for Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), the replacement to 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) and Income Support (IS).  This would therefore limit 
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the benefit to victims of accidents and those suffering from serious long-term 
health problems such as a terminal illness, and thus drastically reduce 
eligibility and un-justifiable claims.   
 
Policy option 13: Supporting new businesses 
A great deal has been done to support new business in recent decades such 
as the creation of the Business Link network (www.businesslink.gov.uk) in 
1993 by the then Department for Trade and Industry.  More could perhaps be 
done to support new small enterprises such a tax breaks during their first two 
years of operation or financial support for training and investment.  This would 
create more jobs and thus reduce unemployment. 
 
More guidance and support could also be made available to the long-term 
unemployed who may wish to start their own businesses or become self-
employed.     
 
Policy option 14: Making job advertisement through the Job Centre 
network compulsory 
To ensure that all jobs are openly advertised, and that the widest number of 
individuals have knowledge of them and can apply for them, it could be made 
legally compulsory that any and all job vacancies must be advertised through 
the Job Centre Plus network, even if they are also being advertised 
elsewhere.   
 
In theory, this would lead to a reduction in LTU and repeat JSA claims as 
workers are able to quickly and clearly examine the entire labour market and 
find the role which best suits their skill set (hopefully increased through policy 
option 2).  The overall result across the labour market could be a move to 
Parreto optimality, i.e. an optimum allocation of resources.   
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Policy conclusions 
Doing nothing is the least desirable option; it will lead to a continuation of LTU 
and the associated social and fiscal costs.  The related problems of LTU and 
repeat JSA claims require action and a combination of some of these policies 
to tackle the individual, familial, institutional, and economic barriers that 
prevent long-term sustained employment may help. 
 
The government must also ensure that the long-term unemployed and repeat 
JSA claimants are not given perverse incentives but instead given the help 
support, and if necessary the push, to find employment. 
 
Some of these policies are controversial, however, the present author 
believes that such radical solutions may become necessary to tackle LTU and 
repeat JSA claims in the future.     
 
Recommendations for further research 
Although this work has explored a wide range of contributing factors towards 
LTU and ‘recycling’, it has remained limited in scope in this vast area of 
discourse, and there remain many questions: 
• We know some of the contributing factors, but are there more that have 
not yet been discovered or fully understood?   
• Exactly how important is each factor?  
• Which policy options would work, how effective would they be, how 
much public money would they save and how much would they 
contribute to the economy? 
• What factors determine whether a company hires a particular 
individual? 
• Are repeat JSA claimants the victims of discrimination on the grounds of 
age, race, physical and mental health? 
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• Are modern Human Resources (HR) practices in both the public and 
private sector reducing the efficiency of the labour market? 
 
These important questions all deserve further examination, and will no doubt 
form part of my future research.   
 
Peter Hill, September 2009.  
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